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BOOK REVIEW
VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE. By Robert E. Keeton.' Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. vi, 183. $6.95.
Reading this book reminded me of a passage in "Christ Stopped at
Eboli," written by Carlo Levi. 2 The readers of Levi's book will
remember that Mussolini and his fascist government exiled Levi to the
boot heel of Italy for political reasons. There he discovered a country
of hills and valleys, covered with clay, and inhabited by peasants with
no hope for the future. He said, on a temporary visit to the north:
I thought of my feeling of strangeness, and of the complete lack of
understanding among those of my friends who concerned themselves
with political questions, of the country to which I was now hurrying
back. They had all asked about conditions in the South and I had told
them what I knew. But although they listened with apparent interest,
very few of them seemed really to follow what I was saying. They were
men of various temperaments and shades of opinion, from stiffnecked
conservatives to fiery radicals. Many of them were very able, and they
all claimed to have meditated upon the "problem of the South" and to
have formulated plans for its solution. But just as their schemes and the
very language in which they were couched would have been
incomprehensible to the peasants, so were the life and needs of the
peasants a closed book to them, and one which they did not even bother
to open.
At bottom, as I now perceived, they were all unconscious Worshipers
of the State. Whether the State they Worshiped was the Fascist State
or the incarnation of quite another dream, they thought of it as
something that transcended both its citizens and their lives. Whether it
was tyrannical or paternalistic, dictatorial or democratic, it remained to
them monolithic, centralized, and remote. This was why the political
leaders and my peasants could never understand one another. The
politicians oversimplified things, even while they clothed them in
philosophical expressions.'
Often, while studying and teaching law, I was discouraged by the
failure of judges to see that they were following a precedent no longer
valid (if it had ever been), and I have been disappointed by the judges'
unwillingness to overrule cases. Over the last 10 years I have been more
and more encouraged as the overruling of decisions increased. What
I Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2 C LE:ix. CHRIST STOPPED AT EBOLI (1947),
3 Reprinted with permission of Farrar, Straus & Giroux, Inc. from CHRIST STOPPED AT EBOLI
by Carlo Levi, copyright 1947.
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Professor Keeton has done is to write about the situations in which
courts have been overruling cases from 1958 to 1968. In his words, the
list of cases ". . covers more than ninety overruling decisions on at
least thirty-five topics, even if immunities and strict products liability
are each counted as only one topic."'
Professor Keeton begins by discussing the ability of courts and
legislatures to create changes in the law. His treatment of prospective
overruling is the best I have ever read on the subject. His view of
advocacy is persuasive-especially when he says:
But the work of a careful advocate, when he is directing his attention
to persuading a court rather than merely to stimulating enthusiasm
among partisans, reflects a sensitivity to the obligation of the court to
reach principled decisions-decisions that are not only reasoned but also
are grounded on premises of nonpartisan character.'
When he writes about "evolutionary revision of legal doctrine,", he
refers to the fact that Cardozo did not overrule any cases in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.7 Although Professor Keeton has a
good explanation of the way he did it, in retrospect I think that
overruling the earlier cases would have produced a sounder result.
Professor Keeton's discussion of juries and trial judges is very good.
His thoughts about interpreting statutes are most interesting, especially
his examination of the ways in which statutes can be written so as to
leave either to the courts or to administrative agencies, or both, the
power to rewrite the law. His comment about defective products made
by manufacturers includes a discussion of Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp.8 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that
the mother of a passenger could recover for her death against
Lockheed, who had manufactured the plane, but could not recover
against American Airlines, who operated the plane, or Kollsman,
manufacturer of the altimeter. This meant that "the man in the
middle" was liable and those on each flank were safe. On the other
hand, in Texas, one court held a manufacturer of impure food may be
held strictly liable, and another held that a retailer was in the same
position, while a wholesaler was not liable. Professor Keeton asks
4. R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 10 (1969).
5. Id. at 57.
6. Id. at 61.
7. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
8. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1963). Professor Keeton's discussion begins on page 102 of his book.
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whether this means ". .. that in Texas the man in the middle is safe
and those on each flank are exposed . . .?"I He recognizes that the
cases decided by the two state courts can be reconciled but suggests
that it might be better if all three of them were held liable, with possible
claims for indemnity or contribution to those who can prove that they
have not produced anything defective. His treatment of the difference
between strict liability for defective products and action under
warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code is also good.
Professor Keeton's discussion of traffic accidents, attacking the
theory of fault liability, and substituting strict liability up to a certain
amount-the proposal made by Professors Keeton and O'Connell-is
a good defense of his position. On the other hand, I have read a good
deal about their proposal and I believe a sounder solution may be
found in the comparative negligence system.
This book is one which I think every law teacher, lawyer, and
especially all judges should read with care. At the conclusion of the
quotation from Levi's book, Levi observes, "The politicians
oversimplified things, even while they clothed them in philosophical
expressions." That is what I believe our judges used to do. It is evident
that our judges and lawyers are becoming more aware of what the law
ought to be, and more willing to overrule precedents, including those
which interpret a statute. 0
On the whole, whether Professor Keeton intended it or not, he has
convinced me that the organization of our government, with executives,
legislators, and courts, is probably the best form that has ever been
developed up to the present. I hope, however, that judges will
increasingly overrule bad decisional law. I can think of many areas in
which we still need improvement-air and water pollution problems
being current examples.
Arno C. Becht*
9 R. KA-I TO\, VENTU'RINGTO DO JUSTICE 105 (1969).
10 Professor Keeton does not cite Schipper v, Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1%5). In this case the defendant, a mass-producing contractor for homes, sold a house to a third
person who later leased it to the plaintiffs. The defendant, in violation of the instructions given
by the manufacturer of the water heater, did not install a mixing valve designed to prevent the
water delivery temperature from being too high, and as a result the plaintiff's 16-month-old son
was severely scalded when he turned on the hot water in the bathroom. The lower court gave
judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the court held that the plaintiffs had an action in
negligence igainst the defendant and also an action for breach of warranty of "habitability."
Although liability against a contractor for negligence has been gaining support by overruling
cases, a "warranty of habitability" is a new idea and probably a good one.
* 'Madill Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
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